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What are the implications of monetary policy shocks when exchange rate pass-
through to prices is sluggish and incomplete? To answer this question, the open-
economy macroeconomic literature has focused on dynamic general equilibrium mod-
els with nominal rigidities in which monopolistic ￿rms price-discriminate across
countries by setting prices in local currency. This mechanism acts to limit the pass-
through from exchange rate changes to foreign prices and largely insulates foreign
economies from domestic monetary policy shocks. Good examples of these mod-
els include Betts and Devereux (2000), Chari et al. (2002), and Kollmann (2001).
However, a much criticized but standard element of this literature is the exogenously
imposed timing of the opportunity ￿rms have for nominal price adjustments.
I address this critique by developing a two-country version of the dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model with state-dependent pricing (SDP) from Dotsey, King, and
Wolman (1999) in which ￿rms price-discriminate across markets by setting price in
local currency.1 In the model, ￿rms pay a single menu cost to have the opportunity
to change their domestic and export prices. The SDP pricing structure implies that
the degree of price rigidity depends on the state of the economy: Over the business
cycle, this pricing structure generates discrete and occasional price adjustments by
￿rms in light of variations in demand and cost conditions. Those changes in eco-
nomic environment a⁄ect not only the intensive margin￿ the level of price adjustment
undertaken by price-adjusting ￿rms￿ but also the extensive margin￿ the fraction of
￿rms actively engaged in price adjustment. I ￿nd that a domestic monetary expan-
sion generates larger spillover e⁄ects to foreign prices and foreign economic activity
under the SDP model, than a similar model with time-dependent pricing (TDP)
because of the interplay between the intensive and extensive margins.
In local-currency pricing models, a domestic monetary expansion a⁄ects ￿rms￿
pro￿ts on exported goods via two channels: a depreciation of the dollar, and an
increase in marginal cost generated by higher domestic demand. On one hand, the
dollar depreciation increases pro￿ts as ￿rms get more dollar for every unit sold in
the foreign market. On the other, the increase in marginal cost shrinks pro￿ts. In
the TDP model, these two e⁄ects roughly balance out over the expected horizon of
price rigidities. Therefore, ￿rms barely adjust export prices following a domestic
1In my previous work (Landry 2009), I look at the implications of monetary policy shocks in a
two-country model with state-dependent pricing in which the law-of-one price holds.
1monetary expansion. In the SDP model, ￿rms have the ability to change their prices
in light of demand and cost conditions. On impact, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and
￿rms decide to lower their export prices to attract foreign demand. However,
the second e⁄ect takes over after a few quarters and ￿rms start raising export
prices. Over the business cycle, these export price movements generate ￿ uctuations
in foreign expenditure without any actions in foreign monetary policy. This result
contradicts the current wisdom and has important implications for the design of
international monetary policy in a local-currency pricing environment.
I take the model to the data by choosing parameter values to replicate the trade
relationship between the U.S. and Canada. I introduce two features to the model to
better capture the business-cycle moments observed in the data. First, I add vari-
able demand elasticity, following the work of Kimball (1995), to generate inertia in
prices and adjustment fractions. Second, I introduce investment with variable cap-
ital utilization, following the work of Baxter and Farr (2005). Investment is needed
to generate the relative volatility of consumption to output, while variable capital
accumulation is needed to smooth investment demand and trade ￿ ows. Overall,
the SDP model￿ s predictions match the business-cycle moments better than the
predictions of the TDP model when driven by monetary policy shocks.
This paper is related to the development of other local-currency pricing SDP
models. For example, Gopinath et al. (2009) study the endogenous currency choice
￿rms face when setting prices, while Gopinath and Itskhoki (2009) study the rela-
tion between the frequency of price adjustment and the level of exchange rate pass-
through. Floden and Wilander (2006) focus on exchange rate pass-through and the
volatility of import prices. These three studies use a partial equilibrium approach
where ￿rms￿decisions are driven by productivity or exchange rate shocks. In con-
trast, I use a general equilibrium approach to study the international business-cycle
transmission of monetary shocks. The nature of the dynamic general equilibrium
approach implies ￿ uctuations in prices and exchange rate pass-through that a⁄ects
foreign economic conditions.
Section 2 of this paper describes the open-economy SDP model. Section 3
presents the model￿ s solution and parameterization. Section 4 discusses the model￿ s
implications. First, I analyze the endogenous evolution of price distributions in
response to a domestic monetary expansion, describe the way these distributions
in￿ uence exchange rate pass-through and international economic activity, and con-
trast the implications of the SDP model with a corresponding TDP model that is
2used as a reference case because of its popularity in the current literature. Then,
I look at the business-cycle implications of the model in which the world economy
experiences shocks to the U.S. and Canadian money stocks. I also examine the
sensitivity of my ￿ndings by varying assumptions about the SDP model benchmark.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries. Each country is populated by a repre-
sentative household, a continuum of monopolistic ￿rms, and a monetary authority.
Households purchase goods produced in both countries for consumption and invest-
ment, and supply labor and capital on a competitive basis. Firms rent labor and
capital from the domestic market to produce goods. They can price-discriminate
across countries and set prices in local currency. The distinctive feature of the
model is that in each period, ￿rms can change their prices by paying a menu cost.
If a ￿rm decides to pay the menu cost, it has the opportunity to change its domestic
and export prices. Once prices are set, ￿rms must satisfy demand.
In what follows, each variable is represented by a country￿ i.e. i;j = 1;2 for
Country 1 (U.S.) and Country 2 (Canada)￿ and time subscripts. When three sub-
scripts are present, the ￿rst denotes the country of production, the second denotes
the country of consumption or investment, and the third denotes time.
2.1 Households
Households are identical across countries except for the local bias introduced in
consumption and investment. They make consumption ci;t and labor supply ni;t
















; for i = 1;2. (1)
The momentary utility function is separable in consumption and leisure. The para-
meter ￿ represents the discount factor, ￿ represents the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and ￿ represents the elasticity of labor supply.
The households￿optimal consumption allocations are de￿ned as a constant elas-




































In these equations, the parameters ￿i for i = 1;2 represent the steady-state shares
of imports into consumption, and ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported goods. The goal of the household is to minimize expenditure
such that equation (2) holds. The solution to the minimization problem yields the
following optimal consumption quantities:
































i;t for i = 1;2 represents the aggregate consumption prices, and PP
i;j;t for
i = 1;2 represents the aggregate producer prices.
Households also choose an optimal amount of capital through investment ii;t.
Investment decisions are made following the capital accumulation equations:





ki;t for i = 1;2, (4)
where ki;t denotes the capital stocks, ￿ the depreciation function with ￿0 > 0 and
￿00 < 0, ui;t the utilization rates of capital, and ￿ the capital adjustment cost with
￿0 > 0 and ￿00 < 0. The households￿optimal investment allocations are identical to
the consumption allocations (2).
Given these optimal choices, aggregate consumption and investment prices are























The benchmark economy features complete risk pooling to isolate the role of
SDP. This implies that households can freely reallocate risk through a complete set
of state-contingent nominal bonds bi;t and corresponding stochastic discount factor
4Dt, such that Et[Dt+1bi;t+1] =
P
st+1 ￿(st+1jst)D(st+1jst)bi(st+1), where ￿(st+1jst)
denotes the probability of the state of nature st+1 given st. The households also
receive capital payments Qi;t from capital services, nominal wages Wi;t from labor
services, and a series of dividend payments Zi;t from ￿rms. In each country, capital
services xi;t are the product of the capital stock and the utilization rate. The se-




i;tii;t + Et[Dt+1bi;t+1] ￿ bi;t + Qi;txi;t + Wi;tni;t + Zi;t for i = 1;2. (6)
The problem for households is then to choose consumption, investment, labor,
and portfolio holdings to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to a sequence of
intertemporal budget constraints (6) and allocation of time. The maximization
problem implies that the ratios of marginal utilities of consumption ￿i;t are equalized







, where St is the dollar price of one unit of foreign currency, and ￿
re￿ ects initial wealth di⁄erences.
Finally, the level of nominal aggregate demand is governed by a cash-in-advance
constraint Mi;t = Pc
i;tci;t + Pi
i;tii;t for i = 1;2, along with money supply rules.
2.2 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms is located on the unit interval
and indexed by z in each country. At any date t, a ￿rm is identi￿ed by its current




. The menu cost
is denominated in labor hours and drawn from a time-invariant distribution G(￿i;t)
common across all ￿rms in country i. Since the indices z are uncorrelated over time,
and there are no other state variables attached to individual ￿rms, price-adjusting
￿rms in the same country ￿nd it optimal to charge a common price in each market.
I restrict the analysis to positive steady-state in￿ ation rates so that the bene￿t of
price adjustment becomes in￿nitely large as the number of periods for which the
price has been ￿xed grows. Given that the support of the distribution G(￿i;t) is
￿nite, there is a ￿nite fraction of vintages in each country Fi, a vintage being a
measure of ￿rms with common domestic and export prices.
52.2.1 Firms￿demand and Aggregate Prices
I introduce variable demand elasticity following the work of Kimball (1995), as in
the open-economy model of Bouakez (2005), Gopinath et al. (2009), Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2009), Gust et al. (2006). In contrast to a Dixit-Stiglitz demand, variable
demand elasticity makes it more costly for adjusting ￿rms to get their prices out of
line with prices set by other ￿rms. However, as opposed to TDP models in which
the timing of price adjustment is ￿xed, SDP and variable demand elasticity increase
the interaction between ￿rms: Variable demand elasticity makes it desirable for
￿rms to keep their prices similar, while SDP makes it feasible for them to do so.






































In these equations, di;j;t represents the demand for goods produced in country
i and purchased in country j. Each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated product such
that Pi;j;t(z) identi￿es the price charged by an individual ￿rm with relative demand
di;j;t(z)=di;j;t. The demand aggregator ￿ is such that an aggregate producer price
index PP
i;j;;t holds in each market. The demand aggregator ￿ is an increasing and
concave function re￿ ecting diminishing demand elasticity and is de￿ned over the
parameters ’ and %. The parameter ’ determines the curvature of the demand
function, while % determines the elasticity of demand at average product prices. A
nice property of this speci￿cation is that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is a special
case represented by ’ = 0.
The demand aggregator de￿nes ￿rms￿relative demand as a function of individual










for i;j = 1;2. (9)
Finally, the aggregate producer prices follow a weighted sum of prices over indi-










dz for i;j = 1;2. (10)
62.2.2 Production
Supply is demand driven, and production by an individual ￿rm is the sum of demand
in the domestic and export markets:









￿ di;j;t for i;j = 1;2. (12)
Equation (12) illustrates that production by an individual ￿rm depends on its
price relative to other domestic ￿rms (PPI) and on the market￿ s demand. Market
demand is determined by the sum of consumption and investment demand such that
di;j;t = ci;j;t + ii;j;t for i;j = 1;2.
Labor used for price adjustment is denoted na
i;t(z), and labor used for production
is denoted n
y




Production by an individual ￿rm is
yi;t(z) = x1￿&
i;t (z) ￿ n&
i;t(z) for i;j = 1;2. (13)
where & represents the labor share in production.
2.2.3 Pricing Policy
In both SDP and TDP frameworks, the ￿rms￿optimal decision can be represented
using a dynamic programming approach: Given the level of demand, the current
menu cost of price adjustment, the current real price, the prevailing real capital
service, and the real wage, individual ￿rms decide whether or not to adjust their
prices with respect to a state vector st. Accordingly, each ￿rm z that has changed






















































for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j, (14)
with the value if the individual ￿rm does vi;0;t or does not vi;f;t adjust, and the opti-
mal prices chosen by adjusting ￿rms b pC
i;i;f;t = Pi;i;f;t=PC
i;t, and b pC
i;j;f;t = StPi;j;f;t=PC
i;t
for i = 1 and j = 2 and b pC
i;j;f;t = Pi;j;t=StPC
i;t for i = 2 and j = 1. Both the optimal
7and current real prices are relative to domestic CPI, which are prices used in ￿rms￿
decisionmaking. ￿i;t;t+1 = ￿i;t+1=￿i;t denotes the ratio of future to current marginal
utility and is the appropriate discount factor for future real pro￿ts. Finally, real














i;j;f;t ￿  i;t
￿
yi;j;t
where  i;t represents marginal cost. Therefore, ￿rms￿pro￿ts are a⁄ected by the
prices received for units sold domestically and abroad and by marginal cost.
Equation (14) shows that the ￿rm must weigh the current and future bene￿ts of
adjusting its prices against the status quo. Price-adjusting ￿rms set prices optimally
and choose cost-minimizing levels of input. Firms that decide not to adjust prices
satisfy demand while choosing inputs to minimize costs. In this model, the fraction
of ￿rms in country i that choose to adjust is ￿i;j;t. These fractions are determined




for i = 1;2. (15)
Finally, the dynamic program (14) implies that the optimal price satis￿es a ￿rst-
order equation balancing pricing e⁄ects on current and expected future pro￿ts. As




















































for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
Iterating these ￿rst-order equations (16) forward, ￿rms￿nominal optimal prices b Pi;j;t





























































where ￿i;f;t;t+f represents the probability of nonadjustment from t to t + j and
￿i;j;f;t+f denotes the elasticity of demand for the individual ￿rm. The optimal
prices charged by price-adjusting ￿rms have a ￿xed markup over real marginal cost
2These are continuous functions on the unit interval 0 ￿ ￿i;f;t ￿ 1 such that the real labor cost
of a marginal ￿rm is ￿ (￿i;f;t) if the fraction of ￿rms ￿i;f;t are adjusting prices. Thus, (15) describes
the endogenous fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms in each country.
8if the demand elasticity and the aggregate prices are expected to be constant over
time. These optimal pricing rules derived from the maximization problem (18)
are generalizations of the types derived in open-economy TDP models (i.e., with
exogenous probabilities of price adjustment). They also represent an open-economy
version of the SDP rule of Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and Dotsey and King
(2005). However, in contrast to their closed-economy counterpart, value-maximizing
￿rms take into account export demand and the nominal exchange rate and, hence,
these factors in￿ uence adjustment probabilities.
2.3 General Equilibrium
The aggregate state of the economy at time t is a vector st = (M1;t;M2;t;￿1;t;￿2;t),
where Mi;t represents the exogenous state variables and ￿i;t represents the period
t distribution of producer prices in country i. Given the aggregate state, a general
equilibrium for the economy is a collection of functions satisfying a set of equilibrium
conditions: a collection of allocations for consumers c1;i1;n1;b1 and c2;i2;n2;b2; a
collection of allocations and prices for ￿rms y1(z);x1(z);n1(z);P1;1(z);P1;2(z) and







2 ;Q2;W2;D2 such that (i) households maximize their utilities, (ii)
￿rms maximize their values, and (iii) aggregate consistency conditions hold. These
aggregate consistency conditions include market-clearing conditions in the goods
and labor markets, and in the time-varying distributions of ￿rms in each country.
3 Solution and Parametrization
3.1 Solution
I use numerical methods to solve the model. First, I compute the steady-state
equilibrium by imposing balanced trade to the model￿ s long-run behavior. The
model￿ s steady-state equilibrium involves the minimum number of vintages that
generate unconditional adjustment by all ￿rms in each country. Second, I take
a linear approximation of the behavioral equations around the steady-state and
compute the linear rational expectations equilibrium using the algorithm developed
by King and Watson (1998).
93.2 Parameterization
Table 1 presents the parameter values for the benchmark economy. I use parameter
values generally accepted in the macroeconomic and open-economy literatures. The
parameters related to trade are chosen to replicate the relationship between the
U.S. and Canada from 1977 to 2005. I chose these two countries because most
Canadian trade is done with the U.S.3 Hence, any shocks originating from the U.S.
is largely transmitted to the Canadian economy through the trade channel, which
is the channel of interest in this paper.
The length of a time period is one quarter of a year. The subjective discount
factor ￿ is 0:99 and implies an annual real rate of return of 4:1 percent. Households
devote 20 percent of their time endowment to work. I choose preference parameter
values that produce a low elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output by setting
the parameter governing the degree of risk aversion ￿ to 0:25 and the parameter
governing the elasticity of labor supply ￿ to 0:05. Those parameter values generate
a marginal cost elasticity of approximately 0:30.4 The Canadian degree of home
bias ￿2 is 0:30, which corresponds to the share of imports in output. Given that
the U.S. represents 90 percent of world output, its degree of home bias ￿1 is 0:03. I
set the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods ￿ to 1:5.
Labor share in production is 0:65. The steady-state depreciation rate equals
0:02. Following Baxter and Crucini (1995), I set ￿ = 1, ￿0 = 1 to ensure that the
steady state of the model is una⁄ected by incorporating capital adjustment cost.
Given that ￿ = ￿0 = 1, the elasticity of i=k with respect to movements in Tobin￿ s
q is governed by the curvature of the adjustment cost function ￿00 set to 15. This
value of adjustment cost elasticity implies that investment is about three times as
volatile as output in the absence of variable capital utilization. Following Baxter
and Farr (2005), I set the elasticity of marginal depreciation to 1.
The variable elasticity demand curves are parameterized by choosing values of
’ so that demand curves have elasticities of 10 at d(z)=d = 1. Setting ￿ to 1.02
implies that a 1 percent increase in price decreases demand by 13 percent, which is
3In 2008, 76 percent of Canadian exports went to the U.S., while 63 percent of Canadian imports
were from the U.S.
4This feature is necessary to generate real rigidity. Together with menu costs of price adjust-
ment, real rigidities generate price rigidities (see Ball and Romer 1989, and Dotsey and King 2005).
Given that the household e¢ ciency condition is wt = c
￿
t n
￿, and that consumption and labor are
approximately equal to output, the elasticity of marginal cost is approximately equal to ￿ + ￿.
10somewhere between the response assumed by Kimball (1995) and Bergin and Feen-
stra (2001). The remaining parameters involve the adjustment-cost distributions
which, along with the demand functions, determine the timing and distribution of
prices. Table 2 presents the steady-state adjustment hazards and vintage fractions
of adjusting ￿rms for each country. The adjustment-cost structure is consistent
with microeconomic data on price adjustment that suggest steady-state adjustment
hazards are quadratic in log relative price deviations (Caballero and Engle 1993).5
The parameter values imply an average age of prices of 1:75 quarters and an ex-
pected price duration of 4:05 quarters. Together, the demand and adjustment-cost
speci￿cations provide a reasonable approximation of the main features governing
the pattern of price adjustments and pricing policies observed in empirical studies
such as Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
Money supply growth is exogenous and follows an autoregressive process of the
form
￿Mi;t = ￿i￿Mi;t￿1 + "i;t for i = 1;2, (18)
where ￿i represents the coe¢ cients of autocorrelation and "i;t are independently and
identically distributed zero-mean disturbances. The value of ￿1 is 0:53 for the U.S.
and the value of ￿2 is 0:42 for Canada. These values come from running a regression
on the logarithm of (18) using M1 quarterly data for the U.S. and Canada. The
standard deviation of the shocks are 1:63 percent in the U.S. and 2:94 percent in
Canada. The cross-correlations of these shocks are chosen to match two moments
observed in the data: the correlation between U.S. and Canadian output, and the
correlation between U.S. output and the U.S. trade balance. I use the simulated
method of moments to ￿nd the cross-correlations of these shocks. Finally, I set
the steady-state money growth rate to 4 percent, which corresponds to the average
in￿ ation rates observed in these countries over the sample period.
4 Findings
In this section, I ￿rst discuss the SDP model￿ s responses to the 1 percent increase
in the U.S. money stock and contrast these responses with those from a TDP model
5I adopt the cost structure used in Dotsey and King (2005) and set the maximum adjustment
cost to 7.5 percent of household production time. This implies that the resources spent adjusting
prices relative to sales average 0.8 percent of ￿rms￿revenues in the steady state, in line with Levy
et al. (1997).
11for which the fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms are held ￿xed at steady-state values.
In contrast to the ￿ at adjustment hazards of Calvo (1983), the TDP adjustment
hazards are similar to Levin (1991), in which the adjustment probabilities are con-
ditional on the amount of time elapsed since a ￿rm￿ s last price adjustment. To get
a better understanding of the mechanism through which money a⁄ects international
economic activity, I start by exploring the reactions of individual ￿rms to a U.S.
monetary expansion in subsection 4.1. In this subsection, I also discuss the amount
of exchange rate pass-through to optimal export prices charged by price-adjusting
￿rms, and to aggregate export prices. In subsection 4.2, I discuss the implications
for trade and other macroeconomic variables. Then, in subsection 4.3, I look at the
business cycle implications of the model in which the world economy experiences
shocks to U.S. and Canadian money stocks. In this subsection, I also explore the
sensitivity of my ￿ndings and highlight the role played by various assumptions about
the benchmark SDP model.
4.1 Firms￿Reactions to a U.S. Monetary Expansion
In this subsection, I look at the ￿rms￿reactions to a U.S. monetary expansion. The
U.S. monetary expansion is transmitted to ￿rms￿pro￿ts through a depreciation of
the U.S. dollar and a rise in marginal costs generated by an increase in domestic
demand. Figure 1 displays the ￿rms￿reactions to a U.S. monetary expansion. The
top row displays the fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms. The middle rows display
the optimal prices chosen by price-adjusting ￿rms for their domestic and export
markets. The bottom rows display the corresponding aggregate prices. In order
to understand the international transmission mechanism, one needs to understand
the pass-through from exchange rate movements to export prices. Table 2 displays
the exchange rate pass-through to both, optimal export prices and aggregate export
prices. I de￿ne the exchange rate pass-through as the percentage change in export
prices relative to a change in currency value.
In the TDP model, ￿rms adjust prices on the intensive margin. The monetary
expansion causes an increase in U.S. demand and induces U.S. price-adjusting ￿rms
to increase both domestic and export prices. I start by looking at the U.S. ￿rms￿
reactions. The U.S. optimal domestic price jumps on impact and slowly converges
to its new long-run value, while the optimal export price increases slightly. On
one hand, a depreciation of the U.S. dollar should induce U.S. ￿rms to reduce
prices in the Canadian market. On the other, the e⁄ect of an expected increase in
12marginal cost induces U.S. ￿rms to increase prices in the Canadian market. These
two e⁄ects roughly balance out in a TDP environment over the expected horizon of
price rigidity. In the current framework, the latter e⁄ect dominates and the optimal
export price increases little. This generates a negative exchange rate pass-through,
both in optimal and aggregate export prices.
Now, let￿ s turn to the behavior of the Canadian ￿rms. The optimal domestic
price stays near steady-state value as domestic demand remains nearly constant.
However, Canadian ￿rms follow their U.S. counterparts in setting U.S. prices: The
optimal export price jumps on impact and slowly converges to its new long-run
value. On impact, this generates a change in optimal export prices that is 70
percent higher than the change in currency value. This aggressive price response
diminishes over time to reach 8 percent after one year. On aggregate, the amount of
exchange rate pass-through is 35 percent on impact and 63 percent after one year.
Firms react di⁄erently in the SDP model because they adjust prices on the in-
tensive and extensive margins. For the U.S. domestic market, SDP means that U.S.
￿rms can make small price adjustments now knowing they can choose to increase
them later when it is more valuable to do so. Therefore, the optimal domestic price
responds little because ￿rms do not want to lose pro￿t by raising prices too aggres-
sively. For the U.S. export market, SDP means that U.S. ￿rms can make bigger
pro￿ts now by lowering the optimal export price. In contrast to the TDP model,
the optimal export price decreases on impact. In fact, the optimal export price
drops 15 percent more than the U.S. dollar. On aggregate, this implies an amount
of exchange rate pass-through of 28 percent. Over time, the increase in marginal
cost takes over and induces ￿rms to adjust prices upward. This becomes obvious
four to six quarters after the monetary expansion as the U.S. adjusting fraction and
optimal prices deviate further from their long-run values. Ultimately, the collective
action of price-adjusting ￿rms feeds into the aggregate price level, and the piling up
of prices and actions leads to higher optimal prices.
In turn, movements in U.S. export prices in￿ uence Canadian ￿rms￿reactions. On
impact, the optimal domestic price stays near steady-state value as domestic demand
remains nearly constant, while Canadian ￿rms follow their U.S. counterparts in
setting U.S. prices. This generates a change in optimal export prices that is 82
percent higher than the change in currency value. As in the TDP model, this
aggressive price response diminishes over time to reach 13 percent after one year.
13After a few quarters, higher export demand raises marginal cost and induces ￿rms
to adjust prices upward. This becomes obvious eight to ten quarters after the
monetary expansion as the Canadian adjusting fraction and optimal prices deviate
further from their long-run values.
4.2 Aggregate Implications to a U.S. Monetary Expansion
Price movements induced by the domestic monetary expansion a⁄ect the aggregate
response of the TDP and SDP models in di⁄erent ways. Figure 2 displays the TDP
model￿ s impulse response functions following the U.S. monetary expansion. The
model predicts a rise in U.S. output, consumption, and investment. In contrast,
Canadian output, consumption, and investment remain close to long-run values:
Canadians perceive little change in prices and barely adjust their expenditure de-
cisions. These responses imply a worsening of the U.S. trade balance: Imports
increase to ful￿ll U.S. demand, while exports see little change. Improvements in
the trade balance arise as U.S. prices adjust.
The story is di⁄erent in the SDP model. Figure 3 displays the SDP model￿ s
impulse-response functions following a U.S. monetary expansion. The model pre-
dicts a rise in U.S. output, consumption, and investment, followed by a contraction
of real economic activity. This contraction arises as U.S. prices rise above long-run
values. Although the contraction lasts for a substantial amount of time, it does
not undo the initial stimulation generated by the monetary expansion. In Canada,
output rises on impact to ful￿ll U.S. demand. The rise in output is followed by
a contraction as domestic and export demand fall. Canadian consumption and
investment contract because prices rise from their long-run values. These responses
imply a worsening of the U.S. trade balance: Imports increase to ful￿ll U.S. demand,
while exports decrease due to falling Canadian demand.
The quantitative implications of the two models for U.S. and Canadian CPI
in￿ ation rates are also di⁄erent. Although both models imply a rising U.S. CPI
in￿ ation rate, the SDP model￿ s response is larger. This arises as the piling up of
￿rms￿prices and actions leads to higher aggregate prices in the SDP model. The
TDP model implies little change in the Canadian CPI in￿ ation rate. In contrast,
in￿ ation rises in the SDP model, without any movements in the Canadian money
stock.
144.3 Business Cycles Analysis
In this subsection, I look at the business cycle implications of the model. First,
I discuss the main features of U.S. and Canadian economic ￿ uctuations as well as
trade between the two countries. Second, I take the model to the data by assuming
that both countries￿money stocks evolve over the business cycle. Finally, I examine
the sensitivity of my ￿ndings by varying assumptions about the benchmark features.
4.3.1 The Data
The U.S. data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, with the exception of the
monetary aggregate and the quarterly exchange rates, which are from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Canadian data are from Statistics
Canada, with the exception of the monetary aggregate, which is from the Bank of
Canada. Appendix A o⁄ers a more detailed description of the data.
Table 4 presents the business cycle statistics for output, consumption, invest-
ment, trade balances, and CPI in￿ ation rates for the U.S. and Canada. The trade
balances include only trade between the two countries and are relative to output.
Table 5 presents the business cycle statistics for real and nominal exchange rates,
as well as for the CPI price ratio. The moments were calculated using a band-pass
business-cycle ￿lter that admits frequency components between 6 and 32 quarters.
Although the data are from 1974Q1 to 2008Q4, the e⁄ective data used in the band-
pass statistics are from 1977Q1 to 2005Q4 (see Baxter and King 1999). All the
variables were de￿ ated using the implicit price de￿ ators for gross domestic product.
Output, consumption, and investment are procyclical, with consumption being
less volatile than output and investment being more volatile than output. The
U.S. trade balance is countercyclical, but the Canadian trade balance is procyclical.
Both have a volatility much lower than output. CPI in￿ ation rates are procyclical
and have a volatility much lower than output. The correlations between U.S. and
Canadian output, consumption, investment, and CPI in￿ ation rates are all positive.
As for international prices, real and nominal exchange rates are highly correlated
and highly volatile relative to output. The CPI price ratio is positively correlated
with the real exchange rate and about half as volatile as output.
154.3.2 The Benchmark Models
Tables 4 and 5 present the ￿ltered moments generated by the SDP and TDP models.
I assume that both countries￿money stocks evolve over the business cycle and that
these shocks are the only exogenous shocks in the model.6 For each model, the cross-
correlations of the monetary shocks are set to reproduce the correlation between U.S.
and Canadian output and the correlation between U.S. output and the U.S. trade
balance observed in the data.
The SDP model performs well in terms of predictions for relative volatility,
autocorrelation, and correlation with output. In the TDP model, the correlation
between Canadian output and the trade balance has the wrong sign, and the corre-
lation between Canadian output and the CPI in￿ ation rate is too strong. Finally,
both models capture the positive cross-country correlations of output, consump-
tion, investment, and CPI in￿ ation rates￿ although the consumption and investment
cross-country correlations are higher than the output cross-country correlation in
the SDP model.
As for international prices, the relative volatilities of the real and nominal ex-
change rates with respect to output are too small in both models. The SDP model
also predicts a negative correlation between the real and nominal exchange rate,
which is contrary to the data. However, the SDP model does a good job matching
the dynamics of the CPI price ratio￿ it does particularly well matching the volatility
of this ratio relative to U.S. output and its correlation relative to the real exchange
rate.
4.3.3 Variations on the Benchmark SDP Model
Finally, I examine the sensitivity of my ￿ndings by varying assumptions about three
of the SDP model￿ s features. Tables 4 and 5 present the business-cycle moments
under the three alternative scenarios: an economy with Dixit-Stiglitz demands (’ =
0), an economy without variable capital utilization (but keeping investment), and
an economy with a single uncontingent nominal bond.
6Technology and other types of shocks are important sources of business cycles. However, many
papers in the literature, notably Chari et al. (2002), compare their model￿ s moments to those of
the data, with movements in money stocks as the only source of exogenous shocks. Thus, I provide
this comparison for my own models as a way to compare my results with those in the literature.
16The variants with Dixit-Stiglitz demands and without variable capital utilization
are able to generate a lower cross-country consumption correlation but perform worst
in many other dimensions, notably in terms of CPI in￿ ation rates and trade balance
dynamics. As for international prices, the correlation between the real exchange rate
and the price ratio has the wrong sign in the variant with Dixit-Stiglitz demands.
Finally, the performance of the variant with a single uncontingent nominal bond is
roughly similar to the SDP model benchmark with complete ￿nancial markets.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed a two-country model with SDP in which ￿rms price-discriminate
across countries by setting prices in the local currency. I show that a domestic mon-
etary expansion has greater spillover e⁄ects to foreign prices and foreign economic
activity than an otherwise identical model with TDP. The spillover e⁄ects arise
because of the interplay between the intensive and extensive margins. This result
suggests that the monetary policy implications associated with local-currency pric-
ing are probably speci￿c to the TDP speci￿cations. Next, I look at the implications
of the business-cycle moments generated by the models and compared them with
moments generated by the data. I ￿nd that the SDP model￿ s predictions match
the business-cycle moments better than the predictions of the TDP model.
Unfortunately, the SDP model has two caveats relative to other TDP models in
the literature. First, by breaking the ability of local-currency pricing to insulate the
foreign economy from a domestic monetary shock, the SDP benchmark model loses
the ability to generate low cross-country consumption and investment correlations.
Second, the SDP model is unable to replicate the dynamics between the real and
nominal exchange rates observed in the data. Adding frictions to ￿x these two
caveats is something to investigate in future research.
17A Data
The data cover the period 1974Q1 to 2008Q4. U.S. data from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis are the implicit price de￿ ators for gross domestic product and for
private consumption. Gross domestic product, private consumption expenditures,
private ￿xed investment, and exports and imports of goods and services to/from
Canada are seasonally adjusted and in billions of U.S. dollars. Canadian data from
Statistics Canada are the implicit price de￿ ators for gross domestic product and for
private consumption. Gross domestic product, personal consumption expenditures,
and business ￿xed investment are seasonally adjusted and in millions of Canadian
dollars. Quarterly averages of the nominal exchange rate and the U.S. monetary ag-
gregate M1, nonseasonally adjusted, are from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. The Canadian monetary aggregate M1, nonseasonally adjusted,
is from the Bank of Canada. Canadian exports and imports of goods and services
to/from the U.S. are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, converted to Canadian
dollars using the quarterly nominal exchange rate.
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20Table 1: Parameter values
Preferences U.S. Canada
￿ Discount rate 0.99 0.99
￿ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.25 0.25
n Fraction of time working 0.20 0.20
￿ Elasticity of labor supply 0.05 0.05
Trade
￿i Degree of home bias 0.03 0.30
￿ Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 1.5 1.5
Investment
& Labor share 0.65 0.65
￿ Depreciation rate 2 2
1=￿ Elasticity of investment 15 15
￿ Elasticity of marginal depreciation 1 1
Demand
% Elasticity of demand 10 10
￿ Demand curvature 1.02 1.02
Monetary policy
￿i Money growth autocorrelation 0.53 0.42
Standard deviation of the shocks 0.13 0.01
21Table 2: Adjustment hazard and vintage fractions
Quarter(s) since last adjustment
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
￿j Adjustment hazard N/A 0.035 0.112 0.221 0.383 0.650 1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 5: Exchange Rates and Prices*
Data SDP TDP DS w/oVCU Bond
Standard deviations relative to U.S. output
Real exchange rate 2.26 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.06
Nominal exchange rate 2.39 0.48 0.37 0.99 1.24 0.46
Price ratio 0.54 0.50 0.34 0.98 1.29 0.49
Autocorrelations
Real exchange rate 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.87
Nominal exchange rate 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.94
Price ratio 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.93
Correlations with the real exchange rate
Nominal exchange rate 0.97 -0.17 0.43 0.18 -0.07 -0.48
Price ratio 0.35 0.34 -0.14 -0.04 0.28 0.58
* SDP: state-dependent pricing model; TDP: time-dependent pricing model; DS: SDP
model with Dixit-Stiglitz demands; w/o VCU: SDP model without variable capital
utilization; Bond: SDP model with a single uncontingent nominal bond.














































































































































































Figure 1: Firms￿reactions to a U.S. monetary expansion. Note: U.S. variables in
blue and Canadian variables in red.




















































































































































































Figure 2: Aggregate implications with time-dependent pricing model. Note: U.S.
variables in blue and Canadian variables in red.




















































































































































































Figure 3: Aggregate implications with state-dependent pricing model. Note: U.S.
variables in blue and Canadian variables in red.
28